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The nation's young adults face a diverse array of labor market prob 
lems. For example, during March 1994, nearly 29 percent of the 
nation's 18-29-year-olds in the adjusted civilian labor force were either 
unemployed, employed part-time for economic reasons, wanted a job 
but were not actively looking for work, or worked but were unable to 
earn enough to exceed the poverty threshold for their household size. 
The incidence of these labor market problems ranged from a low of 9.6 
percent among those young adults completing 17 or more years of 
schooling to a high of 54 percent for those young adults lacking a high 
school diploma or GED.
In response to an array of research studies documenting the difficul 
ties experienced by young people with no formal education beyond 
high school as they seek to enter the labor market, the U.S. Congress in 
1994 enacted modest new school-to-work legislation (School-to-work 
Opportunities Act of 1994) designed to encourage states to experiment 
with comprehensive approaches for improving labor market prospects 
for some high school graduates. Two years earlier, a comprehensive set 
of amendments to the federal Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) also 
was approved, at least in part to respond to continuing concerns about 
the labor market problems of young Americans. Yet current policy 
debates continue to overlook and fail to respond in any meaningful 
way to the most severe and persistent labor market problem facing the 
nation's young adults the sharp declines in their real (inflation- 
adjusted) weekly and annual earnings over the past two decades. These
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deteriorating earnings represent the greatest single threat to their future 
economic prospects, their ability to marry and form stable families, 
and their capacity to financially support their children. These earnings 
declines in many cases have persisted for more than two decades and, 
despite renewed job growth among young adults in 1993 and 1994, 
continue unabated. Current congressional proposals to consolidate fed 
eral job training programs and provide block grant monies to states 
offer no serious response to these profoundly disturbing trends, and 
current major reductions in federal funding for those JTPA training 
programs focused on economically disadvantaged youth may even 
exacerbate them. Pending welfare reforms completely ignore the prob 
lems of families arising from inadequate earnings among young adults 
and are largely rooted in the baseless premise that personal lack of 
motivation to work is the central economic issue for parents now 
receiving welfare benefits.
It is essential that the nation refocus its energies on the crucial eco 
nomic challenges that lie ahead: bolstering the real earnings potential 
of young workers, providing a stronger economic foundation for young 
families, and reducing the growing incidence of child poverty and the 
enormous associated costs that it imposes on American society. With 
out future interventions to assist young dropouts and high school grad 
uates on a scale far surpassing those currently in place, the patterns of 
falling earnings for young workers and rising poverty among young 
parents and their children will continue to erode the very foundations 
of the nation and undermine our future productivity and prosperity for 
generations to come.
Declining Weekly and Annual Earnings of Young Workers
During the past two decades, the real weekly earnings of many sub 
groups of workers have been stagnant or declining. Young workers 
(those under 25) have been most adversely affected by these develop 
ments. The inflation-adjusted median weekly earnings of males 
younger than 25 who were employed full-time fell by 31 percent over 
the 1973-94 period, while those of young women dropped by 14 per 
cent (table 1). '
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While older males (ages 25 and over) also experienced real weekly 
earnings declines during this period, the relative size of their wage 
declines was considerably smaller than among young men. During the 
late 1960s, the median weekly earnings of full-time employed young 
men were equal to nearly three-fourths of those of older men, allowing 
them to assume critical adult responsibilities at a relatively early age, 
to marry, and to provide adequate economic support for their families 
and children. By 1994, however, the median weekly earnings of these 
full-time employed young men had fallen to only one-half the size of 
those of older men.
Table 1. Median Real Weekly Earnings of 16-24-Year-Olds Employed

































SOURCE. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, findings from the Current Population Survey, Nominal 
weekly earnings have been converted into their constant 1993 dollars by the authors using the 
CPI-U-X1 index for the entire country.
While employed young men under 25 years of age experienced the 
most severe deterioration in their real weekly earnings position over 
the past two decades, other young males also suffered a steep decline 
in their real weekly earnings. For example, among men in the 25-34 
age group, median real weekly earnings (in constant 1993 dollars) 
plummeted by 21 percent between 1974 and 1994 while full-time
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employed males ages 35-44 incurred an 8 percent drop in their real 
weekly earnings (table 2).
Table 2. Trends in the Median Real Weekly Earnings of Full-Time Male 
Wage and Salary Workers, 1974 to 1994, by Age Group (in 










































SOURCES: Bradshaw and Stmson 1975, U S Department of Labor 1995a
NOTE Data for 1974 are for May of that year, while the 1994 data are annual averages Prior to
1979, the weekly earnings data from the CPS were only collected once per year
In contrast, older men (45-64) actually earned slightly higher real 
weekly earnings in 1994 than they did twenty years earlier. The age 
structure of male earnings has changed markedly over the past two 
decades, with the size of the age-related differentials in weekly earn 
ings widening considerably. In the early 1970s, employed men in the 
25-34 age group obtained median weekly earnings that were only 6 
percent below those of males in the 45-54 age group; by 1994 the dif 
ferential was nearly 30 percent.
The sharp decline in the real weekly earnings of young men has 
contributed in a substantial manner to the severe drop in the real 
annual earnings of young adult men, particularly those without any 
post-secondary schooling; i.e., the so-called "Forgotten Half (Com 
mission on Work, Family, and Citizenship 1988). Mean annual earn 
ings of the nation's young male adults (ages 20-29) in constant 1993 
dollars peaked in 1973 at just under $20,800. After falling moderately 
through the late 1970s, the mean annual earnings of young men 
declined considerably in the recessionary and highly inflationary envi-
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ronment of 1980-82, improved by nearly 11 percent during the boom 
years of the mid- to late-1980s, and then fell again sharply in the early 
1990s. By 1993, the mean annual earnings of young adult males had 
declined to $15,175, a 27 percent reduction from their peak 1973 level 
(table 3). The magnitude of this real earnings decline clearly consti 
tutes a prolonged "silent depression" (See Peterson 1994). The mean 
level of real annual earnings of young men in 1993 was actually below 
that of 1959. No other demographic group has been so adversely 
affected by the transformation of the U.S. wage structure.
Table 3. Mean Real Annual Earnings of 20-29-Year-Old Males, Selected 








Percent change 1967-73 +10.2
Percent change 1973-93______________-27.0________
NOTE Earnings estimates in this table include those young men with no paid employment during 
the year
These trends stand in sharp contrast to those evidenced in the 1960s 
and the early 1970s when the nation's young adult men experienced 
sustained gains in their real annual earnings. Between 1959 and 1973, 
the mean real annual earnings of 20-24-year-old and 25-29-year-old 
men increased by 24 percent and 35 percent, respectively. These earn 
ings gains were enjoyed by both black and white men and by young 
men in each major educational attainment subgroup, including high 
school dropouts. The rising affluence of young men allowed them to 
marry at high rates before they reached their mid-20s and to increas 
ingly support their families and children at income levels well above 
the poverty line. Real incomes of young families (head under 30 years
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of age) rose sharply over this period, and poverty rates of young fami 
lies, especially those with dependent children, fell sharply.
The year 1973 was a watershed year for both the national economy 
and the nation's young adult men. The mean level of real annual earn 
ings obtained by young men that year remains the post-World War II 
high, and, as noted above, their average annual earnings have declined 
considerably since then. A diverse array of economic, social, and tech 
nological forces has been at work to produce these steep declines in 
young men's annual earnings, particularly among men with no formal 
schooling beyond high school. The nation's tolerance of higher aggre 
gate unemployment rates, a reduction in year-round, full-time job 
opportunities for young men, shifts in the industrial structure of 
employment away from higher paying jobs in goods-producing sec 
tors, and reduced earnings prospects for young men within most major 
industries have contributed to the deterioration in their real earnings 
position over the past twenty years.
The degree of deterioration in the economic fortunes of young men 
has varied considerably by their formal schooling backgrounds, with 
those with limited schooling being most adversely affected. Among 
those young male adults (20-29) with some employment during the 
year, median real annual earnings declined from $21,124 in 1973 to 
$14,589 in 1993, a drop of nearly 31 percent, (table 4).
The relative size of these median earnings declines was quite sub 
stantial for males in each major race-ethnic group, including white, 
non-Hispanics. Those men with more limited schooling, however, were 
characterized by the largest absolute and relative earnings losses, with 
employed high school dropouts experiencing a 42 percent drop and 
high school graduates with no post-secondary schooling a 36 percent 
decline in their median annual earnings. College graduates were not 
isolated from these developments; however, the relative size of their 
annual earnings losses was considerably smaller. As widely noted in 
the labor and education literature, the relative earnings advantages of 
young, male four-year college graduates improved markedly over the 
past two decades; however, none of this gain was attributable to a rise 
in their real earnings position. During 1993, the median real annual 
earnings of employed male four-year college graduates ($24,000) was 
actually only several hundred dollars above that earned by high school 
graduates twenty years earlier. Young male high school graduates in
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1993 had median annual earnings that were several thousand dollars 
below those earned by comparable age male high school dropouts two 
decades earlier. Young men needed several more years of formal 
schooling to maintain the earnings power that existed for them in the 
early 1970s. As Sar Levitan would have noted, "longer" not necessarily 
"higher" education became more essential for labor market success 
among young adults. Nearly all of our national initiatives to address 
this problem have been aimed at keeping young men in school for 
longer periods of time.
Table 4. Median Real Annual Earnings of Employed 20-29-\ ear-Old 
Civilian Males by Race/Ethnic Origin and Educational 






























































The deterioration in the real annual earnings position of young men 
has been exacerbated by increased difficulties in obtaining any paid 
employment. Since the late 1960s, there has been a secular rise in the 
share of young men (20-29 years old) who report no paid employment 
whatsoever during the year. During 1967, only 4 percent of young 
men, including college students, reported no paid employment. By the 
end of the 1970s (a cyclical peak year), this ratio had risen to 6.5 per-
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cent. During the deep recession of 1981-82, the share of young men 
with no paid employment rose above 10 percent, then fell throughout 
the remainder of the 1980s as the economy generated a substantial 
number of net new jobs, and aggregate unemployment rates declined 
steadily. During the slow growth years of the 1990s, however, young 
men experienced greater difficulties in finding employment, and the 
share with no reported earnings rose above 10 percent in 1993, nearly 
double the rate prevailing in 1973.
The rise in the nonemployment rate of young adult men between 
1973 and 1993 occurred in each major race-ethnic and educational 
attainment subgroup. This problem, however, became most intense 
among young black men and among those males lacking a high school 
diploma or GED certificate. During 1993, nearly two of every nine 
young Black men and one of every six high school dropouts reported 
no paid employment whatsoever. Given the importance of cumulative 
work experience in influencing earnings in later adult years, these find 
ings do not bode well for their future labor market prospects. Work 
experience is both a source of annual earnings and an investment in 
one's human capital.
The rise in the share of young men with no paid employment during 
the year has been accompanied by a declining share of young men 
reporting full-time, year-round employment; i.e., 50 or more weeks of 
paid employment for an average of 35 or more hours per week. The 
fraction of young adult men employed year round, full time fell from 
57 percent in 1973 to 52 percent in 1993. The decline was particularly 
steep among young black men (from 52 to 40 percent) and among both 
high school dropouts and high school graduates with no post-second 
ary schooling. Males with one to four years of college actually 
improved their ability to obtain year-round, full-time jobs over this 
time period..
The severe deterioration in the real annual earnings position of 
young men has reduced their ability to form independent households 
and to marry. Over the past twenty years, the fraction of 20-29-year-old 
men who remain living at home with their parents or other family rela 
tives has increased from 32 percent to 43 percent, and the marriage rate 
of young men those married and living with their spouses has 
declined considerably from 58 percent in early 1974 to under 34 per-
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cent in 1993. These social trends have been driven in part by the rela 
tive decline in the earnings of young males.
One of the more widely used measures of the adequacy of workers' 
earnings is their ability to earn enough to lift a family of four above the 
poverty line. In 1993, the average weighted poverty threshold for a 
four-person family was $14,763. Findings in table 4 reveal that the 
fraction of young civilian males who were able to achieve this mini 
mum earnings threshold in 1993 was slightly under 45 percent, repre 
senting a substantial drop from the 63 percent share who were able to 
do so in 1973. (table 5). Again, the declines in this minimum earnings 
adequacy measure were quite large among whites, blacks, and Hispan- 
ics. During 1993, only one-third of young black and Hispanic males 
had succeeded in obtaining an annual earnings level above the four- 
person poverty line.
Table 5. Percent of 20-29-Year-Old Civilian Males with Annual Earnings 
above the Four-Person Poverty Line, by Race/Ethnic Origin 




All 62.6 44.7 -17.9
White, non-Hispanic 64.9 49.7 -15.3
Black, non-Hispanic 49.2 32.9 -16.3
Hispanic 57.2 32.5 -24.7
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All educational attainment subgroups with the exception of college 
students experienced a decline in their ability to obtain an annual earn 
ings level above the four-person poverty line between 1973 and 1993.
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Again, the declines in minimum earnings adequacy were considerably 
larger among those young men who had completed twelve or fewer 
years of schooling. The steep deterioration in the earnings capacity of 
young men with no post-secondary schooling has contributed in a sub 
stantive way to the decline in their marriage rates. Using a form of shift 
share analysis, we have estimated that the shifts in the distribution of 
dropouts and high school graduates across real earnings categories 
between 1973 and 1993 can account for 30 to 40 percent of the decline 
in their marriage rates over this time period. Unfortunately, the drop in 
their marriage rates was not accompanied by an equally large decline 
in their parenting rates; thus, a rapidly growing fraction of young fami 
lies with dependent children now consist of single-mother and single- 
father families, whose poverty rates are considerably above those of 
married-couple families.
While the mean and median real annual earnings of young men 
were declining markedly over the past two decades, the earnings distri 
bution for employed young men has become substantially more 
unequal (table 6). The share of total earnings from wages, salaries, and 
self-employment income received by employed men in the top quintile 
(fifth) of the earnings distribution has risen from 39.7 percent in 1973 
to 43.5 percent in 1993, a relative increase of 10 percent. The top 
decile (tenth) alone increased their share of total earnings from 21 per 
cent to 27 percent. Thus, all of the gain in the top quintile's share 
accrued to those earners in the top half of this quintile.
Table 6. Earnings Shares of Employed 20-29-Year-Old Civilian Males by 
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This growing earnings inequality among young men reflects sharp 
growth in the size of the earnings differentials between the best-edu 
cated males and their less-educated counterparts. Formal education is 
sorting the winners and losers in U.S. labor markets more strongly than 
before. However, even within most educational attainment subgroups, 
earnings inequality also widened; this was particularly true for high 
school dropouts and for those high school graduates lacking any post- 
secondary schooling, but was not true of those completing four or more 
years of college.
The steep annual earnings declines of young men over the past two 
decades have been accompanied by fairly sizable reductions in their 
access to key employee benefits, including health insurance coverage 
and pension coverage. 2 Young adult males (20-29) are the most poorly 
insured age/gender group in the United States, and their health insur 
ance coverage has declined over time (table 7)
Table 7. Percent of 20-29-Year-Old Civilian Males with Some Form of
Health Insurance and Employer-Financed Health Insurance by 
Race/Ethnic Origin and Educational Attainment, 1979 and 1993
(A) 





























































All 56.1 38.6 -17.5 -31%
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During 1979, just under 80 percent of the nation's young adult men 
(ages 20-29) were covered by some form of health insurance coverage 
at work, at school, through the plan of their spouse or another family 
member, through a self-purchased plan, or through Medicaid. By 1993, 
their incidence of health insurance coverage of any type had declined 
to 67 percent. These declines in coverage occurred among young men 
in every major race/ethnic group and in all educational attainment sub 
groups. The relative and absolute size of these declines were most 
severe among Hispanics, high school dropouts, and high school gradu 
ates lacking any post-secondary schooling. During 1993, health insur 
ance coverage rates for young adult men ranged from lows of 42 
percent for those lacking a high school diploma to a high of 91 percent 
for those men having completed one or more years of college beyond 
the bachelor's degree.
Expectations that young adults will generally enjoy relatively good 
health have diminished concern for this phenomenon. During 1992, 
however, one of every six young men (20-29) who reported no employ 
ment during the year cited "illness or disability" reasons for not work 
ing.3 Among high school dropouts and graduates with no post- 
secondary schooling, nearly 30 percent cited health-related reasons for 
their inability to secure any employment during that year. Substantial 
growth in the SSI disability caseloads among young adults also pro 
vides evidence of growing health-related labor market problems 
(including substance abuse) that do not bode well for the future labor 
force participation of such men.
The same trends mark access to pensions which has also plummeted 
for young men since the late 1970s. During 1979, only 37 percent of 
young men (20-29) were covered by a pension plan at their work site; 
however, by 1993, their pension coverage rate had dropped to 23 per 
cent. With the exception of students, pension plan coverage has fallen 
for males in each educational attainment subgroup, with high school 
dropouts and those completing only twelve years of school experienc 
ing the most severe declines in coverage. During 1993, pension plan 
coverage rates ranged from 9 percent for high school dropouts to a 
high of 43 percent for males completing one or more years of school 
ing beyond the bachelor's degree. In a recent address to the nation's 
newspaper writers, President Clinton commented on the existence of a 
growing economic divide in the United States and claimed that formal
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education was its "fault line." This finding appears to be particularly 
true of the widening economic inequalities among the nation's young 
men in the mid-1990s.
The Influence of the Changing Industrial Structure of Jobs
A number of potential explanations of the declines in the average 
earnings of young men have been advanced by labor market analysts 
and sociologists (see Johnson and Sum 1987; Kasarda 1985; Sum and 
Fogg 1991). Most supply-side explanations (with the exception of 
increased immigration) have little validity, particularly in explaining 
earnings declines during the past decade, since the absolute number of 
young male adults has been declining, the formal educational attain 
ment of young men has improved, and a higher fraction of 20-29-year- 
olds in recent years were in their mid- to late-20s relative to the situa 
tion in 1973. Slightly higher mean ages should imply a greater number 
of years of potential work experience and higher expected earnings.
Among the demand-side explanations for the declining annual earn 
ings of young men has been the shift in the industrial structure of job 
opportunities, especially the loss of jobs in key goods-producing indus 
tries and the increased movement of young men into the retail trade 
and selected private service industries (business services, personal and 
entertainment services) with their attendant lower wage levels. The 
reduction in the relative share of job opportunities for young men in 
key manufacturing, mining, transportation, communications, and utili 
ties industries combined with important changes in the occupational 
staffing patterns of these industries and hiring policies of employers  
have had the effect of decreasing the number of skilled and semiskilled 
blue collar jobs for young men, especially those with no post-second 
ary schooling.
Comparisons of the industrial structure of the jobs held by employed 
young men in 1973 and 1993 clearly reveal a shift in employment 
away from most goods-producing industries (especially durable manu 
facturing) and the relatively high-wage transportation, utilities, and 
wholesale trade sectors toward retail trade and the nonprofessional ser 
vice industries (table 8). In 1973, nearly 30 percent of employed young
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males held jobs in the nation's manufacturing industries; however, by 
1993, their share of jobs in this sector had declined to 19 percent, with 
major losses occurring in the more heavily unionized durable goods- 
manufacturing industries (primary metals, fabricated metals, automo 
bile production). Employment shares also declined in mining, 
construction, transportation, public utilities, and wholesale trade. 
Retail trade and nonprofessional service industries became major 
employers of young men, with their combined share rising from 22 
percent in 1973 to just under 38 percent in 1993. Retail trade industries 
became the dominant employer of young men by 1993, with eating and 
drinking establishments and convenience stores absorbing a substantial 
number of young men within this sector.
Table 8. Distribution of Employed 20-29-Year-Old Civilian Males by 
Major Industry, 1973 and 1993
Major industry group




















































Given the prevailing interindustry wage structure in 1973, these sec 
toral employment shifts by themselves would have been expected to 
generate modest earnings declines for young men over the past two 
decades. During 1973, the mean annual earnings of employed men in
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durable manufacturing industries were 9 percent above the average for 
all employed young men, and those employed in transportation/com 
munications and wholesale trade earned annual wages 14 to 16 percent 
above the average (table 9).
Table 9. Mean Real Annual Earnings of Employed 20-29-Year-Old 
Civilian Males, by Major Industry Group, 1973 and 1993
Major industry group



































































Retail trade and other service industries, which rapidly expanded 
their shares of employed men, were characterized by mean annual 
earnings levels 14 to 21 percent below the average in 1973. Thus, the 
observed interindustry employment shifts would have been expected to 
exert some downward pressure on young men's earnings in the absence 
of sustained productivity gains in these sectors.
A careful review of the annual earnings data by major industry for 
1973 and 1993 reveals that young men also experienced substantial 
earnings declines within most of these eleven industrial sectors. 
Excluding the finance/insurance and public administration sectors, 
which together employed only 7 percent of young males in 1993, the
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estimated relative sizes of these annual earnings declines ranged from 
13 percent in nondurable manufacturing to 33 percent in retail trade.
A modified form of shift-share analysis can be used to illustrate the 
contribution of each of the above two factors (interindustry shifts in 
employment and declining real earnings within industries) to the 
observed decline in the mean annual earnings of employed young men 
between 1973 and 1993. If the interindustry distribution of jobs in 
1993 had been identical to that of 1973 but real earnings within each 
major sector remained at their 1993 levels, then the mean annual earn 
ings of young men during that year would have been $17,971 rather 
than the $16,916 actually observed in 1993. The interindustry shifts in 
employment would have been expected to reduce real 1993 annual 
earnings by $1,055, or only 21 percent of the actual observed decline. 
The overwhelming share (82 percent) of the earnings decline of young 
adult men was attributable to steep earnings reductions within most 
industrial sectors.
Earnings declines within sectors are due in part to shifts in employ 
ment toward industries in lower-paying segments of each sector (e.g., 
the greater movement away from employment in steel, metals manu 
facturing, machinery, and auto-related industries in the durable manu 
facturing sector and the shift toward eating and drinking 
establishments within retail trade). In 1973, the number of 20-29-year- 
old men employed in metals, machinery, and auto-related manufactur 
ing industries was 1.92 million, nearly six times as many as were 
employed in eating and drinking establishments. By 1993, there were 
nearly twice as many men in eating and drinking firms (1.36 million) 
as in all of the above manufacturing industries. Part of the earnings 
decline, however, is due to the fact that many employers were able to 
reduce entry-level wages for jobs occupied by young men, especially 
those outside of the traditional college labor market.
Within certain key segments of the retail trade sector, such as eating 
and drinking establishments, food stores, grocery stores, and variety 
stores, the failure of real wages to rise is attributable to the decline in 
labor productivity in these industries over the 1973-92 period (see 
U.S.Department of Labor 1995c). The sizable earnings declines for 
young men within manufacturing, however, cannot be explained by 
productivity factors. Output per hour of labor in the nation's manufac 
turing industries is estimated to have increased by more than 40 per-
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cent between 1979 and 1993.4 These large productivity gains, however, 
were not shared by most manufacturing workers, especially blue-collar 
production workers whose real hourly earnings actually declined over 
this period (see Sum and Goicoechea 1991). Productivity gains, thus, 
seem to be necessary but not sufficient for boosting the real earnings of 
young males in the current U.S. economy.
Training Experiences of Young Adults
The sizes of the annual earnings differences between male college 
and high school graduates and between high school graduates and 
dropouts tend to widen considerably as they move through their adult 
years. Among the possible explanations for the increasing size of the 
gaps between the age-earnings profiles of workers by years of formal 
schooling are the impacts of greater training investments (both formal 
and informal and both on-the-job and off-site) in better-educated work 
ers. A number of recent longitudinal and cross-sectional studies of the 
training experiences of young adults reveal that the likelihood of young 
workers receiving training from their employers tends to vary signifi 
cantly by both their years of education an^l their literacy proficiencies 
(see Veum 1993).
Findings of the January 1991 CPS survey on the training experi 
ences of U.S. workers can be used to provide insights on this set of 
issues. The survey captured information on the receipt of training by 
employed workers (16+) since they were hired for their current job. 
Findings for employed young adults (20-29, both sexes combined) 
reveal that nearly three of every eight had received some training to 
improve their skills since being hired (table 10). However, the inci 
dence of their receipt of such training varied widely by years of school 
ing completed, ranging from a low of 18 percent for those young adults 
lacking a high school diploma to a high of 53 percent for those com 
pleting 16 or more years of schooling. The personal economic payoffs 
from training to improve skills in the form of higher weekly earnings 
to dropouts and high school graduates appeared to be quite sizable at 
the time of the survey (see Eck 1993).
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Table 10. Training Experiences of Employed 20-29 -Year-Olds, (Men and 
Women) by Educational Attainment: U.S., 1991 
















Received some training to 
improve skills since 
being hired 36.6 17.9 30.2 40.2 52.9
Percent of training in a 
formal company training 
program 36.7 25.4 31.7 35.4 45.4
Percent of training in 
informal on- the-job 
training 42.0 62.1 48.6 44.1 29.3
Received some training to 
improve skills in a 
formal company 
program___________13.4____4.5_____9.6____14.2____24.0
SOURCE January 1991 CPS survey, Job Training Supplement, tabulations by Center for Labor 
Market Studies, Northeastern University.
Among those young adults obtaining some training to upgrade their 
skills, the types of training received also varied markedly by years of 
schooling completed. Four-year college graduates were much more 
likely than their less-educated counterparts to obtain formal training 
from their employers, while school dropouts and high school graduates 
were more likely to receive informal on-the-job training. When the 
receipt of any type of training and the incidence of formal training are 
taken jointly into consideration, the gaps in formal training among 
schooling groups widen considerably. Fewer than 5 percent of young 
high school dropouts had received any formal training from their 
employers since starting their current jobs versus 10 percent of high 
school graduates and 24 percent of four-year college graduates. Formal 
company training has been found to have the most consistent and larg 
est economic payoffs to workers while informal on-the-job training has 
much more moderate and less-persistent earnings effects (see Lynch 
1994). The training investments of the nation's employers, thus, likely
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have a considerable influence on the expected lifetime earnings of 
workers and contribute in an important way to the rising earnings dif 
ferentials between the best- and least-educated workers in American 
society.
Trends in the Economic Well-Being of Young Families 
and Their Children
The state of affluence among families in the United States has often 
been represented by the real income level of the average American 
family, and the median income is most often used to portray the aver 
age. Following a more than doubling in its real value between 1949 and 
1973, the median real income of U.S. families has been basically stag 
nant over the past two decades. While real family incomes continue to 
rise during periods of sustained economic growth and fall during reces 
sions, the long-term secular trend over the past two decades has 
yielded just a 3 percent rise. Given the steep declines in the real earn 
ings of many young male adults and the continued growth in the share 
of single-parent families among young families, one would expect that 
young families (those headed by a person under 30 years of age) would 
have faced greater difficulties than their older counterparts in maintain 
ing their real incomes over the past twenty years. Such unfortunately 
was clearly the case. Between 1973 and 1992, the median real income 
of the nation's young families declined by 20 percent, while families 
with a householder between 30 and 64 years of age experienced a mod 
erate increase (4 percent) in their living standard over this time period. 
The nation's elderly families (those with a householder 65 and over) 
fared the best over the past twenty years, experiencing a 34 percent rate 
of growth in their median income at a time when their numbers were 
rising rapidly.
Families with one or more own children (under 18 years of age) 
present in the home have experienced real income losses over the past 
two decades, while families without children boosted their median real 
incomes by just under 14 percent. These differences were particularly 
pronounced among the nation's young families. Young families with 
one or more own children in the home were characterized by a one-
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third drop in their median real income, while young families without 
children boosted their real income by 4 percent over the 1973-92 
period. By 1992, the median income of young families without chil 
dren ($35,000) was nearly twice as high as that of families with chil 
dren. The latter group of young families contained a growing share of 
single-parent families (including a growing number of single-father 
families) and were more likely than childless families to be headed by 
young adults with no post-secondary schooling. Their deteriorating 
economic position was thus influenced by a combination of demo 
graphic forces and the changing structure of earnings for young adults 
with more limited formal schooling.
Trends in the real income position of the nation's young families 
varied widely by type of family and the educational attainment of the 
householder. Young married couple families came closest to maintain 
ing their purchasing power over the 1973-92 period; however, married 
couple families with children fared considerably worse than their coun 
terparts who remained childless (-10 percent versus +5 percent). By 
having the wife participate more frequently and intensively in the labor 
market and by postponing childbearing, young, childless married cou 
ple families were able to moderately improve their real income posi 
tion over the past few decades. Young male- and female-headed 
families with no spouse present incurred substantial declines (-21 per 
cent and -24 percent) in their median real incomes over the same time 
period. The absence of a second earner to cushion the income declines 
from the reduced earnings power of the head was largely responsible 
for this set of findings. By 1992, young female-headed families had a 
median income of less than $8,000, only one-fourth the size of the 
median income of young married couple families. The frequent 
absence of any child support income for young single-parent families 
kept their incomes quite low. Fewer than one of six single never-mar 
ried mothers under the age of 25 reported to have received any child 
support income during 1992.
Changes in the economic fate of young families have been strongly 
associated with the educational attainment of the householder. Young 
families headed by an individual lacking a high school diploma experi 
enced a 47 percent decline in their median real incomes over the past 
two decades, while those headed by a high school graduate fared only 
marginally better (-37 percent). In sharp contrast, those young families
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headed by a four-year college graduate improved their real income 
position by 14 percent, a result entirely due to the increased annual 
earnings of the wives in such families.
Given the steep decline in the average real incomes of young fami 
lies and growing income inequality among such families, one would 
expect poverty problems to have intensified, particularly among those 
young families with children. Progress in reducing overall family pov 
erty problems on a sustained basis came to an end in 1973. The poverty 
rate for all families in the United States was 11.7 percent in 1992, three 
full percentage points or one-third higher than in 1973. All of the rise 
in the overall family poverty rate was attributable to families with chil 
dren. During 1992, slightly more than 17 percent of all such families 
were poor, a near two-thirds rise from their poverty rate of 1973. Young 
families with children experienced the largest absolute and relative rise 
in poverty, with their poverty rate more than doubling to 35 percent by 
1992. All of the important gains achieved in reducing poverty problems 
among the nation's young families with children between 1959 and 
1973 were completely eliminated by 1992.
The nation's children have been most profoundly affected by these 
family income and poverty developments. Between 1973 and 1992, the 
poverty rate among all children (under 18) living in families rose from 
13 percent to just under 21 percent, substantially surpassing the pov 
erty rate of adults. Children had become the most poverty prone group 
in American society. Children residing in young primary families were 
most severely impacted by these developments, with the poverty rate of 
these children more than doubling over the past two decades. By 1992, 
slightly more than 42 percent of the children in the nation's young fam 
ilies were poor.
Poverty rates among children in young families rose in each family 
subgroup, including married couple families as well as single-parent 
families and among whites as well as among Asians, blacks, and His- 
panics. In fact, poverty rates among children in young married couple 
families rose more rapidly in relative terms, nearly tripling over this 
time period, and the poverty rate among white, non-Hispanic children 
more than doubled, rising to nearly 30 percent by 1992. Despite their 
lower relative increases in poverty rates over this period, children in 
young black and Hispanic families remained highly poverty prone in 
1992. During that year, seven of every ten black children and a slight
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majority of Hispanic children (52 percent) in young families were liv 
ing in poverty conditions. Given the adverse influence of poverty living 
conditions on many aspects of child development, these trends are 
likely to have severe adverse consequences for the nation's economic 
and social future.
The Growth of Young Subfamilies
All of the above analyses of the real incomes and poverty status of 
young families have been based on the experiences of primary fami 
lies, i.e., those young families that occupy their own separate living 
quarters. Over the past two decades, however, there has been a growing 
number of young families with children who either remain in the home 
of their parents or other relatives (related subfamilies) or share the 
household living quarters of others to whom they are not related (unre 
lated subfamilies). Since the early 1980s, the U.S. Census Bureau has 
made a more concerted effort to explicitly identify the number of such 
subfamilies in the CPS household survey. The number of such subfam 
ilies headed by a person under 30 years of age is quite considerable 
(nearly 1.9 million in March 1994), and nearly 90 percent of these 
young subfamilies have one or more own children under 18 living with 
them.
Between 1983 and 1993, the estimated number of young subfami 
lies with children increased from 1.54 million to 1.69 million while the 
number of primary young families with children was actually declining 
as a consequence of a reduced number of young adults and declining 
marriage rates. During 1983, these young subfamilies with dependent 
children accounted for just under 19 percent of the total number of 
young primary families and subfamilies with a child. By 1993, how 
ever, these young subfamilies, most of whom are headed by a single 
parent, accounted for nearly 22 percent of all young families and sub 
families with children.
Given the high fraction of young related subfamilies that consist of 
single-parent families and the limited schooling and work experience 
of the subfamily householders, many of these subfamilies with chil 
dren have very low incomes and would be classified as poor if they did
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not live with their parents or other relatives with higher money 
incomes. While the poverty status of unrelated subfamilies is deter 
mined solely on the money income of the subfamily, the poverty status 
of these related subfamilies and their children is based on the com 
bined money income of all related members of the family household. 
During March 1993, there were 2.33 million children living in young 
subfamilies. Using existing Census Bureau procedures for classifying 
their poverty status, somewhat more than 845,000 of these children, or 
36 percent, were residing in poor families. If the poverty status of these 
children had been based solely on the money incomes of the subfami 
lies to which they belonged, then 1.67 million or 72 percent of them 
would have been classified as poor. Combining the findings for chil 
dren in young primary families with those in all young subfamilies, 
nearly 48 percent of all children in the nation's young families and sub 
families would have been classified as poor in early 1993.
Children raised in poor families face a number of critical develop 
mental problems, including malnutrition, poor health care, limited cog 
nitive skills, inadequate housing, and more limited exposure to high- 
quality preschool educational services, that often have long-term con 
sequences for their educational attainment, intellectual development, 
parenting behavior, and criminal justice experiences. 5 Given the 
increasing importance of human capital investments for the labor mar 
ket success of adult workers and the economic growth of the nation, 
the existence of these extraordinarily high rates of child poverty among 
young families and subfamilies does not bode well for the nation's 
social or economic future.
Policy Options for Strengthening Young Worker Earnings 
and Family Incomes
The deterioration in the economic fortunes of many young workers 
and families over the past two decades has been quite severe and perva 
sive, especially among those young adults who did not graduate from 
college. Given the multiple sources and causes of these declines in real 
earnings and incomes, there is no single economic strategy or public 
policy intervention that by itself will ensure the future economic well-
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being of young workers and their families. Concerted and coordinated 
actions, both private and public, now are needed to address these prob 
lems. Forthcoming demographic developments, including a sustained 
rise in the number of 18-24-year-olds as we move through the end of 
the 1990s decade, will create new labor supply pressures and may 
exacerbate the problem of declining real earnings for many young 
adults. Yet initiatives on a variety of fronts, including macro-level labor 
market developments, innovative school programs, employer practices, 
and public policy interventions at the national, state, and local level, 
could contribute to a substantive improvement in the future economic 
fortunes of young adults and families.
First, high rates of job growth and the attainment of full employ 
ment conditions in the nation's labor markets (an overall unemploy 
ment rate ranging from 4 percent to 5 percent) would facilitate a steady 
expansion of employment opportunities for young male adults and pro 
vide increased access to year-round, full-time jobs, especially for those 
males with no post-secondary schooling and African-American males. 
A strong labor market also disproportionately increases in-school 
employment opportunities for high school students. Early work experi 
ence has favorable short- and long-term impacts on the post-high 
school employment and earnings experiences of high school graduates, 
particularly those not enrolling in four-year colleges and universities.
Second, continuing efforts must be made by state and local educa 
tional agencies to increase high school graduation rates and improve 
the basic academic proficiencies of all high school students, especially 
those from economically disadvantaged families and from race-ethnic 
minority groups. Findings from the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth (NLSY) on the adult poverty experiences of poor adolescents 
reveal that those youth who completed more years of formal schooling 
and obtained stronger basic skill proficiencies were far more successful 
in avoiding poverty problems in their mid- to late-20s. Similar strong 
relationships between schooling/basic skills and adult poverty status 
also prevailed among those adolescents who lived in families with 
incomes above the official poverty line. State and local school 
improvement initiatives, reinforced by federal investments targeted on 
disadvantaged children, can make an important difference in this area.
Third, there is a critical need for expanding formal training activities 
for young adults at the workplace, both in the private sector and in gov-
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ernment agencies. Research has revealed that apprenticeship training 
and formal training from employers has consistently generated large 
economic payoffs for workers. Unfortunately, members of the nation's 
"Forgotten Half are considerably less likely than college graduates to 
receive formal training from their employers, and few (under 3 per 
cent) participate in a formal apprenticeship training program within the 
first six years following high school graduation. Under the newly 
enacted School-to-work Opportunities Act of 1994, state and local 
education agencies, including community colleges, should work 
closely with employers and labor unions to expand formal training and 
apprenticeship opportunities for young adults. Financial incentives for 
both students and employers to participate in such programs should be 
provided, including the ability of students to use Pell grants to pur 
chase certified formal training from private sector employers, the use 
of state UI trust funds to encourage industrywide formal training activ 
ities and new apprenticeship programs, and the use of federal work 
force development funds by states to expand formal company training 
opportunities for entry-level workers with no post-secondary school 
ing.
Fourth, young workers need to obtain jobs in a more diversified set 
of industries and firms, including larger employers in goods-producing 
industries, professional service industries, and government agencies. 
Sustained efforts should be made by high school training programs, 
postsecondary education and training programs, the Job Service, and 
JTPA Private Industry Councils to work with private sector firms and 
government agencies to reduce the high concentration of young adults 
employed in retail trade and nonprofessional service industries.
Fifth, high schools, community colleges, and local training agen 
cies should be encouraged to work closely with private sector employ 
ers in retail trade and private service industries (which are expected to 
account for 70 percent of the net increase in employment over the next 
ten years) to restructure existing jobs so that entry-level workers can 
become more productive and stable, thereby allowing them to earn 
higher hourly wages and obtain key employee benefits, including 
health insurance.
Sixth, efforts to strengthen the real income position of young fami 
lies must focus upon increasing the real earnings potential of the fam 
ily householders, both men and women. Many of the above policy
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recommendations would assist in achieving this objective; however, 
other actions could help complement these policies. The expanded 
Earned Income Tax Credits (EITC) for low income families with chil 
dren enacted in 1993 should be maintained by the Congress. Many 
young families with children would benefit from these larger tax cred 
its. Expanded health insurance coverage for low-income families with 
children and increased child care assistance for parents in low-wage 
jobs would boost their financial stability and strengthen economic 
incentives to work. The federal and state governments also should 
experiment with wage subsidies for welfare recipients to increase 
incentives to work and to boost their disposable incomes from paid 
employment. Early findings from the Canadian Self-Sufficiency 
Project, which was designed to supplement earnings from employment 
for former public assistance recipients, suggest that such programs can 
boost both employment rates and net incomes ("Canadian Research 
Focuses on Many Employment/Unemployment Aspects" 1995). Such 
efforts, if combined with steady increases in the minimum wage to off 
set erosion in its real value due to inflation, could reduce reliance upon 
welfare and poverty among young working families.
Seventh, national, state, and local governments should provide 
greater economic incentives for young adults to form married-couple 
families through joint investments in their human capital. Additional 
earned income tax credits at the state level for low-income married- 
couple families, expanded access to health insurance coverage for 
young workers and their children, and priority status in housing allow 
ance and home buyer assistance programs all deserve consideration by 
policy makers. Family investment plans that outline the responsibilities 
and obligations of young family heads and their spouses for the receipt 
of such assistance could be developed at the local level through family 
investment centers that contained representatives of key local and state 
employment and training, health, housing, and social service agencies 
(see Levitan, Pines, and Mangum 1989).
Finally, the federal and state governments must expand the awarding 
and enforcement of child support orders for all absent fathers and 
mothers, especially among the young and unwed. Single, never-mar 
ried mothers under the age of 30 are the least likely to receive any for 
mal child care support from absent fathers. 6 These are the same 
families that are most likely to be poor, and they experience the most
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severe poverty income deficits. Efforts to improve the earnings capac 
ity and parenting responsibilities of young absent fathers also should 
be promoted. The higher the annual earnings of young absent fathers, 
the more likely they are to pay child support on a regular basis and the 
higher will be their average level of child support payments. Fathers 
who have strong ties with their children and visit them frequently also 
are significantly more likely to pay child support. Unfortunately, few 
existing employment and training programs are designed to simulta 
neously improve young fathers' employ ability and earnings capacity, 
as well as their daily relationships with their children.
The economic plight of young workers and young families has 
intensified over two decades, and the powerful forces driving their real 
earnings and incomes downward will not be reversed easily or quickly. 
Yet the nation must turn its attention to this essential task. If serious 
responses are not developed and sustained over time, there is little hope 
of reversing the increases in out-of-wedlock childbearing and child 
poverty that now place the well-being of future generations of Ameri 
cans in grave jeopardy.
NOTES
1 The more conservative CPI-UXI index of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics rather than the 
CPI-U index was used to convert the nominal weekly earnings for young men and women into 
their constant 1993 dollar equivalents. Use of the CPI-U index would have increased the estimated 
size of the weekly earnings declines between 1973 and 1994 by a little more than 6 percent
2 For an earlier review of trends in health insurance coverage among all young adults through 
the late 1980s, see Sum and Fogg (1991a).
3 For evidence on these issues, see Sum, Heliotis, and Fogg (1993)
4. For a review of labor productivity trends of the nation over the past twenty years, see U S. 
Department of Labor (1995b).
5. For a comprehensive review of the long-term personal and social consequences of child 
hood poverty, see Sherman (1994)
6 For a review of national evidence on this issue for young absent fathers in the mid-1980s, 
see Sum and Ostrower (1994).
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